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Abstract
We propose that virtue ethics can be used to address ethical issues central to discussions about sex robots. In particular, we argue
virtue ethics is well equipped to focus on the implications of sex robots for human moral character. Our evaluation develops
in four steps. First, we present virtue ethics as a suitable framework for the evaluation of human–robot relationships. Second,
we show the advantages of our virtue ethical account of sex robots by comparing it to current instrumentalist approaches,
showing how the former better captures the reciprocal interaction between robots and their users. Third, we examine how a
virtue ethical analysis of intimate human–robot relationships could inspire the design of robots that support the cultivation
of virtues. We suggest that a sex robot which is equipped with a consent-module could support the cultivation of compassion
when used in supervised, therapeutic scenarios. Fourth, we discuss the ethical implications of our analysis for user autonomy
and responsibility.
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1 Introduction
Some may find it hard to come to grips with sex robots. Yet
recent events, like the 2015 Campaign Against Sex Robots
in the UK, the 2017 publication of John Danaher and Neil
McArthur’s volume on the ethical and societal implications
of robot sex [18], and the fourth incarnation of the Interna-
tional Conference on Love and Sex with Robots, show that
this topic has captured the public’s eye and provokes seri-
ous academic debate. A recent report by the Foundation for
Responsible Robotics [42] calls for a broad and informed
societal discussion on intimate robotics, because manufac-
turers are taking initial steps towards building sex robots. We
take up this call by applying virtue ethics to analyse intimate
human–robot relationships.
Why should we look at such relationships through the lens
of virtue ethics? Virtue ethics is one of the three main ethical
theories on offer and distinguishes itself by putting human
moral character centre stage—as opposed to the intentions
or consequences of actions. Virtue ethics has been discussed
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in relation to artificial intelligence more generally [49,54].
However, virtue ethics has received relatively little atten-
tion in discussions regarding sex with robots, even though
sex robots could have a significant impact on their user’s
moral character. Two main exceptions are Strikwerda [48],
who assesses arguments against the use of child sex robots,
and Sparrow [47], who suggests that rape representation by
robots could encourage the cultivation of vices. Our aims are
different, as we will not focus on either child sex robots or
robots that play into rape fantasies. Instead, we propose how
virtue ethics can be used to contribute to the potential posi-
tive aspects of intimate human–robot interactions through the
cultivation of virtues, and provide suggestions for the design
process of such robots.
We develop our thesis in four steps. First, we present
virtue ethics in relation to other ethical theories and argue
that, because of its focus on the situatedness of human moral
character, virtue ethics is in a better position to assess aspects
of intimate human–robot interaction (see also [51, p. 209]).
Second, we show how our virtue ethical account fares better
than current instrumentalist approaches to sex robots, such
as those inspired by the seminal and pioneering work of Levy
[32,33]. Such instrumentalist approaches focus too much on
the usability aspects of the interaction and, unjustly, frame sex
robots as neutral tools. Understanding the interaction with a
sex robot as mere consumption insufficiently acknowledges
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the risk of their influence on how humans think about and
act on love and sex. Third, we propose a way to reduce the
risks identified by considering how the cultivation of com-
passion as a virtue may help in practising consent-scenarios
in therapeutic settings. This way, we aim to show how, under
certain conditions, love and sex with robots might actually
help to enhance human behaviour. Fourth, we examine the
implications our virtue ethical analysis on intimate human–
robot relations may have on our understanding of autonomy
and responsibility.
2 Virtue Ethics and Social Robotics
Current ethical debates on human–robot interaction are gen-
erally not framed in terms of virtues, but in terms of action
outcomes or rules to be followed. It strikes us as regrettable
that up until now, virtue ethics has received relatively little
attention in the literature on social robotics in general, and on
intimate human–robot relations in particular (but see [3,27]).
A virtue-ethical analysis can help evaluate how, on the one
hand, human agents could make use of love and sex robots in
ways that may be judged to be (un)problematic. On the other
hand, virtue ethics may help to clarify how human behaviour
and societal views are influenced by the use of such robots and
thereby help us to learn more about what it is to be a virtuous
person in an intimate relationship. To establish the potential
of virtue ethics for the evaluation of intimate human–robot
relationships, we will examine aspects of virtue ethics rele-
vant to the current discussion and consider what it has to add
compared to other ethical approaches.
Virtue ethics departs from the idea that the cultivation
of human character is fundamental to questions of moral-
ity. In the Western philosophical tradition, Aristotle’s theory
of virtue ethics is the most influential and he defines virtue
as an excellent trait of character.1 Such traits, like honesty,
courage and compassion, are stable dispositions to reliably
act in the right way according to the situation one is in. Aris-
totle describes a virtue as, in general, the right mean between
two extremes (vices). He states that courage, for example,
can be described as the mean between recklessness and cow-
ardice (Nicomachean Ethics, II.1104a7). Finding the right
middle between extremes is a challenging task and approach-
ing that middle often requires extensive practice. In addition
to practice, acquiring a virtue is helped by instruction from a
exemplary teacher. A virtuous person will have cultivated her
character to be disposed to naturally act in the right way in
1 Other influential virtue ethical traditions originated with, for exam-
ple, Confucius or Buddhism. For reasons of space, we shall restrict
ourselves to a (neo-)Aristotelian account of virtue, but we suspect that
the investigation of other virtue traditions could yield an interesting
intercultural approach to the ethics of social robotics. See also [51].
the relevant situation. It should be noted that although virtues
are not about singular acts, acting honestly, courageously or
compassionately may help a person to become honest, coura-
geous or compassionate. This potential interactive loop, of
internalising behaviour by practice and feedback, motivates
our interest in applying virtue ethics to intimate human–robot
interaction.
Consequentialism and deontology are the two main rival
theories to virtue ethics, and they dominate current discus-
sions on the ethics of social robotics. Consequentialism is the
ethical doctrine that takes the outcome of an action as fun-
damental to normative questions. Deontology or duty-based
ethics takes the principles motivating an action as central
to matters of morality. Operationalization of these frame-
works can take different forms. For example, in the case
of consequentialism, artificial agents could be programmed
to evaluate the potential costs and benefits of an action
[20,25,41,55]. Or, in the case of deontology, designers may
strive to implement top-level moral rules in agents [19].2 As
consequentialism and deontology provide frameworks that
can be translated relatively straightforward into implemen-
tation guidelines, they may be attractive from a roboticist’s
perspective. While we value the contributions of consequen-
tialist and deontological approaches to the literature on robot
ethics, we think that there are ethical issues which virtue
ethics is in a better position to address. Such issues includes
how, in the words of Vallor [51], advances in social robots
are “shaping human habits, skills, and traits of character for
the better, or for worse” (p. 211). Importantly, this insight
supports the idea that robots are not neutral instruments, but
that they may influence the way we think and act. We side,
therefore, with other researchers who recognize that virtue
ethics can be a fruitful framework for AI and robotics [3,
p. 37].
There are at least three ways in which virtues (and vices)
might play a role in social robotics. First, we may consider
which virtues are or ought to be involved on the human side
of robot design. For instance, is it desirable that a roboti-
cist exhibits unbiasedness and inclusiveness when designing
a robot? Second, robots may nudge users towards virtuous
(or vicious) behaviour. An exercise robot, for example, can
encourage proper exercise and discipline by giving positive
feedback to its user. Third, robots may exhibit virtues (and
vices) through their own behaviour. This can be illustrated by
the Sociable Trash Box robot developed at Michio Okada’s
lab at Toyohashi University of Technology [56]: these robots
exhibit helpfulness and politeness through their vocalisations
2 Isaac Asimov’s famous laws of robotics, often cited as illustration in
the ethics of AI literature, are modelled after deontological formulations
of how one ought to act. They brilliantly showcase the inherent tension
between deontological robotic directives and the potentially disastrous
consequences that strict adherence to these might have.
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Fig. 1 The Sociable Trash Box exhibits helpfulness and politeness
when it requests trash and then bows after receiving it. Reprinted by
permission from Springer Nature: Springer International Journal of
Social Robotics [56], © 2019
and bowing behaviour when they collaborate with humans
to dispose of trash (see Fig. 1). So one could focus on the
virtues of the designer, on the way robot behaviour affects
the virtues of a human interacting with it, or on the virtues
displayed by the robot, for instance, as an example to be fol-
lowed or learned from. We will focus on the latter two points,
but towards the end discuss their implications for design.
We think it is likely that the degree of anthropomorphism
[11,15,45,46] will play an important role for especially the
second and third topics. This needs to be further investigated,
but for the purposes of this paper we will discuss robots
that tend towards the anthropomorphic rather than the more
functional end—like conventional sex toys—of the anthro-
pomorphism spectrum.
In relation to the third aspect, some have said that virtues
might be difficult, or even intractable, to implement in a
robot. This idea is motivated by the complexity of giving gen-
eral, context-independent definitions of specific virtues and
because an implementation of a virtue like honesty “requires
an algorithm for determining whether any given action is hon-
estly performed” [5, p. 258]. Although we acknowledge the
specific implementation challenges that virtue ethics brings,
we think these challenges can be addressed by looking at
the underlying mistaken assumption that virtues need to be
implemented top-down into the robot. Analogous to how
humans learn to be virtuous not by being told what to do but
by example, implementing virtues into the design of social
robots can take a similar situational approach. For this rea-
son, it has been argued that the “virtue-based approach to
ethics, especially that of Aristotle, seems to resonate well
with the […] connectionist approach to AI. Both seem to
emphasize the immediate, the perceptual, the non-symbolic.
Both emphasize development by training rather than by the
teaching of abstract theory” [27, p. 249]. This resemblance,
we suggest, can help inspire the implementation of virtues in
modern-day robots. The use of machine learning with arti-
ficial neural networks may be a way of avoiding the need
to write an algorithm that specifies what action needs to
be taken when. Virtues that depend on, for example, rec-
ognizing emotions in a human and require an emotional
response can be implemented by training a neural network
on selected input—say, by analysing videos of previously
screened empathic responses made by humans (as done
by Refs. [29,31]). Through machine learning, robots could
similarly learn to mimic certain behaviours that we might
consider displays of virtue, such as a light touch on the shoul-
der to express sympathy. The challenging research question
here would be how to operationalize this kind of training so
that the robot learns from human teachers. Such implemen-
tations are not trivial, but they need not be intractable either.
Two potential points of critique need to be addressed
before moving on. The first critique has been voiced by robot
ethicist Robert Sparrow [47], who argues that sex robots
could encourage vicious behaviour, while at the same time
maintaining that he finds it hard to imagine sex robots could
promote virtue. He proposes that if people own sex robots,
they can live out whatever fantasies they have on the robots—
even rape. He argues that repeated fantasizing and repeated
exercise of potential representations of rape will influence
one’s character to become more vicious. Though we agree
with Sparrow’s premise that this development is problem-
atic and deserves careful consideration, we disagree with the
conclusion drawn. While rape representation might be facili-
tated by sex robots, this does not mean that the production of
such robots need always be ethically inimical. Let us assume
that rape-play between two consenting adults is not neces-
sarily morally wrong.3 What is potentially morally wrong in
acting out this scenario, is that it might normalize the associ-
ated repeated behaviour outside of a consensual context—the
cultivation of a vice. This could lead to unwanted degrad-
ing behaviour or generalization to other contexts involving
human–human interaction. The same risk of inappropriate
generalization applies to the scenario of the human–robot
interaction. In the case of humans, this means that careful
and continuous communication about what is allowed and
what is not is crucial: the partners have to trust and respect
each other in order to safely play out the fantasy and stay
aware of the fact that it is a fantasy. Might a similar approach
be possible to intimate human–robot interactions? We submit
that there are ways to involve consent in the case of intimate
human–robot interaction aimed to prevent the risk Sparrow is
drawing attention to, without condemning the manufacture
3 It is worth noting that on Sparrow’s account one will have to bite the
bullet and say that rape-play by consenting adults is morally wrong as
well. Not everyone will be willing to accept this implication.
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Table 1 Suppose we compare the multiple approaches in a hypothet-
ical scenario where sexual consent is negotiated, verbal or otherwise,
between two human partners. This table aims to showhowsuch a sce-
nario can be analysed in the differentways discussed in the present paper.
This rough distinction should not be taken to mean that, for example,
consequentialism cannot talk about virtues. What distinguishes the dif-
ferent approaches is which concept they take to be central
Consequentialism Deontology Virtue ethics Instrumentalism
Fundamental concept Action outcomes Moral rule Virtue Instrumental use
Concept applied Obtaining consent
maximizes well-being
for both parties
Obtaining consent is in
accordance with the
rule: “Do unto others
as you would be done
by”
Obtaining consent is
compassionate and
respectful
Obtaining consent is not
necessary, unless
required for obtaining
satisfaction
and use of sex robots in principle.4 It would require us to
rethink sex education and the role sex robots can play in this,
which we do in Sect. 4. Interestingly, if one accepts that sex
robots may cultivate vices in humans, it seems possible that
such robots potentially also cultivate virtues.5
A second issue that needs addressing is a more general
critique against virtue ethics. It has been argued that virtue
ethics as an ethical theory is “elitist and overly demanding
and, consequently, it is claimed that the virtuous life plau-
sibly could prove unattainable” [26, p. 223]. Why propose
such a demanding ethical theory for framing human–robot
interaction? First, because virtue ethics can do justice to an
assumption we make, namely that intimate, sexual relations
between humans and robots should be understood as bi-
directional. In this context, bi-directional means that humans
design robots, while the general availability of such robots in
turn may influence human practice of and ideas on intimacy
and love. In contrast, current ways of thinking about intimate
human–robot relations often depart from an instrumental and
unidirectional assumption. Such rival accounts understand
these relations as the usage of tools by humans and see any
influence that robots may have on humans as value-neutral.
They are focused on the human perspective and therefore lose
sight of important potential ethical implications of human–
robot interaction, as we will argue in Sect. 3 and as illustrated
in Table 1. Our assumption is in line with current develop-
ments in cognitive science and philosophy of technology,
4 Obviously, the consent provided by a robot does not amount to legally
binding consent, just like the rape of a robot would not constitute legal
rape, for the simple reason that a robot is not a legal person and not
a sentient being. Hence, we are discussing here the implications of a
robot behaving in a certain way, not necessarily implying the existence
of human-like cognitive, emotional states or identical legal status.
5 Sparrow [47] finds it “much less plausible that sustaining kind and
loving relationships with robots can be sufficient to make us virtuous”
(p. 473). He acknowledges, however, that such a claim needs to be sup-
ported by an argument as to why virtues are to be held against a standard
different from vices and that this is a topic for further discussion. We do
not share his intuition, though we agree with his latter point and would
furthermore like to add that more empirical data on how human–robot
interaction influences human behaviour is needed—which is one of the
motivations for the proposal in Sect. 4 of the present paper.
which suggest that the cognitive and moral dimensions of
artefact interaction need to be understood from a distributed
perspective that puts equal emphasis on agent and environ-
ment [17,22,52,53].
Another and possibly even more exciting reason to engage
with virtue ethics, is that thinking about virtues in relation to
robots might actually help to make virtuous behaviour more
attainable. This might be done through the habit-reinforcing
guidance of humans by robots designed to promote virtu-
ous behaviour: either by robots nudging human behaviour
directly or by robots exhibiting virtues themselves.
3 Contra Instrumentalist Accounts
Recent discussions on intimate human–robot relations are
often informed by the work of Levy [32,33]. Levy argues that
humans will have physically realistic, human-like sex with
robots and feel deep emotions for and even fall in love with
them. Although we laud the pioneering work Levy has done
to open up sex and love with robots for serious academic
discussion, we argue that his framework fails to properly
account for the ethical and social implications involved.
Regarding sex, Levy suggests that, physically speaking,
realistic human-like sex with robots will be possible in the
near future. Though Levy paints a colourful history of the
development of sex technologies, discussion of this is not of
prime importance for our argument and we will not examine
it further. For the present discussion, we will assume that
the physical aspects of these robots can be worked out more
or less along the lines which Levy describes. Interestingly,
Levy goes so far as to say that “robot sex could become better
for many people than sex with humans, as robots surpass
human sexual technique and become capable of satisfying
everyone’s sexual needs” [32, p. 249].
Regarding emotions and love, Levy suggests that it is pos-
sible that humans can be attracted to and even fall in love with
robots. Without going into too much unnecessary detail, his
argument proceeds in four steps. First, Levy lists what causes
attraction of humans to each other. Second, he considers how
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affective relationships between humans and pets develop,
and, third, how such relationships develop between humans
and their virtual pets. Fourth and finally, Levy applies his
findings to human–robot relationships.
Through a careful examination of feelings of bonding
and attraction in humans, Levy comes to the conclusion that
humans will likely develop similar feelings of bonding and
attraction for robots. A large role in this narrative is reserved
for the human tendency to anthropomorphize artefacts (see
[13,45]). He submits that “each and every one of the main
factors that psychologists have found to be the major causes
for humans falling in love with humans, can almost equally
apply to humans falling in love with robots” [32, p. 128]. It
seems that there are no major hindrances for humans to, at
some point in the future, fall in love with their robot. We can,
in principle, agree, with this conclusion and it furthermore
looks like recent preliminary empirical evidence supports it
[40].
Obstacles on the path towards the use of love and sex
robots are deemed by Levy to be of a merely practical nature.
The robots described are presented as taking care and rec-
ognizing the needs of their human partner—in terms of the
feelings of bonding and attraction he listed earlier. On sev-
eral occasions [32,34, pp. 219, 233] Levy compares sex with
a robot to masturbation, and uses that comparison as a rea-
son why robot-sex would prevent cheating on one’s partner
[p. 234]—like in the case of soldiers on a long-term mis-
sion. Moreover, Levy describes this perspective on sex as a
kind of “consumption” [32, p. 242]. It is for this reason that
we characterize accounts such as Levy’s as ‘instrumentalist.’
Love and sex robots, on such accounts, are merely tools to be
used or products to be consumed. However, we suggest that
such an instrumentalist perspective could lead to practices
that provide cause for concern. Also, we are not convinced
that a purely instrumentalist use of sex robots would make
many people “better balanced human beings” [p. 240].
A first concern is that framing robot-sex as consumption
underestimates the potential impact the acceptation of love
and sex robots will have on the way love and sex are per-
ceived. Consider a world where your “robot will arrive from
the factory with these parameters set as you specified, but it
will always be possible to ask for more ardour, more passion,
or less, according to your mood and energy level. At some
point it will not even be necessary to ask, because your robot
will, through its relationship with you, have learned to read
your moods and desires and to act accordingly” [32, p. 129].
Why would people, when such partners are available, be
content with any kind of relationship, emotional or sexual,
that would not adhere to this standard of perfection? Access
to these robots would make it tempting to view relationships
as essentially one-directional need-catering and effortless,
especially perhaps for adolescents who grow up with such
access. This is not how love and sex at present needs to be or
even generally is conceived, and it goes deeply against the
conception of a relationship as existing between two or more
equal persons. Seeing humanoid robots capable of emotional
and sexual interaction as tools is like being in a relationship
with a slave. There lies an important question at the core of
this issue, specifically on whether there are ways of consid-
ering the relationship between human and robot that are not
slave-like. However, this falls outside the scope of the current
paper (though for a beginning of an answer to this ques-
tion, see [15]). In any case, this comparison illustrates the
extent to which Levy’s framework is unidirectional, which
is further exemplified by his comparison of robot-sex with
masturbation. Masturbation, at least generally speaking, is a
solitary enterprise, and does not reflect the reciprocal interac-
tion that characterizes a typical sex encounter between two
partners.6 Precisely because robot-sex does not amount to
either masturbation or sex between consenting adults, one
needs to address its particular ethical implications.
The second worry is that the instrumentalist approach
allows for downplaying the risk of addiction inherent in inter-
acting with robots that can perceive and immediately cater
to their partner’s every need. Consider how Levy describes
that “robots will be programmable never to fall out of love
with their human, and they will be able to ensure that their
human never falls out of love with them” and “your robot’s
emotion detection system will continuously monitor the level
of your affection for it, and as that level drops, your robot
will experiment with changes in behaviour until its appeal
to you has reverted to normal” [32, p. 118]. This sounds
like the perfect gambling machine, which constantly updates
its rules according to its user’s desires—though these robots
are potentially far more addictive than any currently exist-
ing gambling machine. We think this issue is insufficiently
addressed by instrumentalist approaches such as Levy’s,
because, if one thinks of robots as merely neutral tools, as he
does, then any risk of addiction rests solely on the shoulders
of the user and not on a robot or its designers. However, it is
an open question whether this is how robot-sex will be expe-
rienced by human users (or their significant others). Rather,
we suggest that robots are not merely neutral tools.
A convincing argument in this regard is provided by
Verbeek [53], who argues that for instance an obstetric ultra-
sound is not merely a neutral tool, a ‘looking glass’ into the
womb. Its use raises important ethical questions, like “What
will we do when it looks like our unborn child has Down
syndrome?” or social pressure such as “Why did you decide
to let the child [with Down syndrome] be born, given that
you knew and you could have avoided it?”, or more general
societal questions like “Is it desirable that ultrasonography
6 This also illustrates that robot-sex is not or need not always be wrong.
This would be as extravagant a claim as the suggestion that masturbation
is always wrong.
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leads to a rise of abortions because of less severe defects like
a harelip?” [53, p. 27]. This shows that the use of obstet-
ric ultrasound influences our moral domain. It is naive to
think that using technologies would not shape our behaviour
and societal practices. Instead, it is better to think about this
shaping of behaviour while designing technology. Similarly,
instead of seeing robots as neutral tools, we should acknowl-
edge that, for instance, robots may evoke more emotions
in us than other tools do, as Scheutz [39] suggests. More
importantly perhaps, the design and use of intimate robots
presuppose or establish certain practices concerning ‘appro-
priate intimacy.’ At the very least, these practices and their
underlying assumptions should be elucidated.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the above account.
First, humans and technologies should not be seen as sep-
arately existing entities, with technology providing neutral
products for human consumption. Secondly, ethical analyses
are not based on pre-given ideas or criteria, but need to re-
evaluate how human-artefact interaction may be influenced
or radically changed by new technologies. This means that
stakeholders participating in the design of technologies have
a responsibility both in considering how their products will
shape human behaviour and reflecting on the ethical issues
that may arise with the use of their product.
On this view, designers are “practical ethicists, using mat-
ter rather than ideas as a medium of morality” [53, p. 90].
In this framework there is room for the moral aspects of
technologies in a pragmatic context, without it becoming
a ‘thou shalt not’-like ethics. A virtue-ethical approach is
exactly what the topic of intimate relations with robots needs,
because interacting with a robot as an artificial partner is, even
more so than with a regular artefact, a relationship which inti-
mately shapes our own dispositional behaviour and societal
views as well. On first sight, Levy seems open to a more
interactive view when he refers to Sherry Turkle, taking up
her line of thought in saying that he “is certain that robots
will transform human notions” including “notions of love
and sexuality” [32, p. 15]. The way Levy discusses situated-
ness resonates with the notions that humans and technologies
should not be seen as strictly separate entities and that cer-
tain concepts are not pre-given but arise out of interaction
between humans and artefacts. Does that mean Levy has suc-
cessfully anticipated critique along the lines we have set out?
It does not.
Although Levy seems sensitive to the two notions men-
tioned, in practice it is merely a lip-service to interactive
human–technology approaches. His instrumentalist treat-
ment of human–robot relations deals with humans and robots
in terms of isolated atoms with only a one-way connection
between them, from user to robot, without any consideration
of the larger reciprocal interactive effects on behaviour and
social practices. He does not analyse robot-sex in terms of the
structures and situatedness he earlier described. Any instru-
mentalist framework will focus on the human, subject side
of things and portray robots as neutral artefacts to be used.
What Levy describes is a trend of an increasing acceptation
of robot sex, not how it would actually constitute or change
(our conceptions of) sex or intimate relationships. Even if one
agrees that masturbation is not cheating—an open question,
likely to be influenced by many contextual factors—that does
not necessarily mean that having sex with a robot will not be
considered as cheating. An intelligent android functions on
a distinctively different level of companionship than, say,
a vibrator. More dramatically, if instrumentalist thinkers on
the one hand argue that an intimate relationship with a robot
is possible and imply that these kinds of relationships can
be as intense and realistic as intimate relationships between
humans, then they should agree that being intimate with such
a robot, while in a relationship with someone else, could be
construed as cheating. At the very least, one has to concede
that robot-sex in such a scenario cannot simply be equated to
masturbation. In other words, even assuming that one would
find it hard to imagine someone being jealous about one’s
partner using a vibrator, one could still imagine jealousy
plays a role when one’s partner engages in sexual activities
with a very human-looking and acting robot.7
The analysis we have given shows that instrumentalist
approaches may leave crucial ethical considerations unad-
dressed. Notions of love and sex will be changed by the
development of humanlike robots. But how will these notions
change? If we can have sex robots which are “always willing,
always ready to please and to satisfy, and totally committed”
[32, p. 229], what will that do to the way we view relation-
ships? An understanding of robot-sex not as instrumental,
neutral use of tools, but as involving a reciprocal interaction
between human agents, robots and their designers is required
to develop adequate answers to questions such as these. This
is where virtue ethics can provide a guide for evaluation of
such interactions.
4 Consent Practice Through Sex Robots
In order to investigate how sex robots could make a positive
contribution to human moral character, we draw on virtue
ethics for ideas on how to cultivate virtues and connect those
to insights from current empirical data provided by literature
on robotics and psychology. Our aim is to avoid the problem
of cultivating vices through repeated unnegotiated practice—
7 The Swedish science-fiction television drama Äkta människor (Real
humans, 2012) depicts an example of this when the relationship between
Therese (Camilla Larsson) and her husband turns sour because he grows
jealous of her ‘hubot’—a humanoid robot capable of exactly the func-
tions Levy discusses. This depiction is fictional of course, but the force
of the story at least casts doubt on any outright dismissal of the possi-
bility that humans will become jealous of robots.
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such as illustrated by Sparrow. Indeed, well designed robots
may create the possibility to actually improve attitudes and
behavioural habits regarding sex. First, consider the human–
sex robot rape play scenario again. Previously, we argued that
what is problematic about this scenario is not the act between
consenting adults itself, but the potential normalization of
behaviour it could lead to. For instance, the human participant
may become accustomed to immediate satisfaction of desires
through the use of a human-looking object and might extend
the involved behavioural patterns to objectify other humans.
One way of preventing unwanted behavioural patterns is
by providing sex robots with a module that can initiate a
consent scenario. Like consenting humans, a robot and its
human partner will have to communicate carefully about
the kind of interaction that will take place and the human
will be confronted by the subject-like appearance and the
behaviour of the robot. And like in a relationship between
humans, this communication could potentially result in the
robot sometimes not consenting and terminating the interac-
tion. Such interaction with a robot might prevent the practice
of unidirectional behavioural habits and a resulting increased
objectification of other humans.8 This consideration suggests
that the potential psychological and behavioural benefits of a
consent-module will make it at least worthy of investigation.
One should notice too, however, that a consent-module may
negatively affect the potential economic gains of sex-robot
producers, a consequence that is not our main concern here.
Second, there are potential benefits with respect to sex prac-
tice and cultural perception in general in the consent-module,
namely in cultivating the virtue of compassion. Though we
focus on compassion for the sake of limiting the scope of
this case study, other virtues, such as respect, likely ought to
play a role in consent-practice as well. We take compassion
here as the ability to care for and open up to another person
without losing sight of one’s own needs and feelings. Virtu-
ous displays of compassion strike the right balance between
care for others and for oneself. Compassion can motivate a
desire to help others and we take it to be related to, though
distinct from, empathy (see [28]).
A robot equipped with a consent-module could potentially
be used to investigate ways of improving consent practice
in general. Often, partners communicate their willingness to
engage in sex through nonverbal cues [14]. Yet, because non-
8 On the other hand, one might argue, as Sparrow does, that a non-
consenting robot could potentially facilitate (the representation of) rape
scenarios even more if the human partner ignores the robot’s consent.
We do not have a solution for that problem here (although, for example,
a simple ‘complete close-and-shutdown’ routine might be an option),
but it is a main reason why we later in this paper suggest to test this
kind of human–robot interaction in a therapeutic setting first, as testing
under supervision may give us new insights on how to potentially deal
with issues such as these. In any case, we are not convinced that this
argument is sufficient to not further investigate the potential benefits of
consenting robots.
verbal cues can be ambiguous, miscommunication can and
does occur [2]. In response, some governmental institutions
have advocated the need for active, verbal consent. The prac-
tice of active consent has been met by at least two problems.
First, even verbal consent does not necessarily mean that a
partner is freely engaging in sex, because, for example, social
pressure or substance abuse may be involved [35]. Second,
explicit consent has met with cultural resistance, as men and
women generally believe discussing consent decreases the
chance that sex will occur [30]. Still, active consent is seen
as a crucial way of combating sexual assault and rape, for
example, at college campuses [1,8,12]. There is a need to
change perceptions and practice, especially by men [4], con-
cerning healthy consent and sexual practices. Virtuous sex
robots – supervised—might help facilitate a much needed
cultural change in this regard by further investigating ways
of navigating consent.
The advantage of using sex robots over traditional top-
down education is that the robots can provide a kind of
embodied training that helps adolescents in negotiating sex-
ual consent. Interaction with a compassion-cultivating sex
robot could raise awareness of how these scenarios could
play out and alter behaviour through training. A sex robot
which not only can practise consent scenarios with a human
partner, but which can actually cultivate a virtue like compas-
sion could potentially be used in sex education and therapy. A
robot cannot suffer and so any moral harm during education
or training will be minimized. It seems to us that compassion
is a suitable virtue to be practised using sex robots in sex
education and therapy. If successful in clinical trials, such
robots can be used to support a change in perception and
behaviour of consensual sex on a larger scale, and not just
with adolescents.
One might be sceptical as to whether robots can facili-
tate a dependable long-term change in compassion—both in
negative or positive ways. It seems reasonable not to judge
this prematurely, as assessing the long-term effects of sexual
human–robot interactions requires empirical investigation by
sexologists and psychologists. A number of interesting exper-
iments on the influence of social robots on human behaviour
in more general terms, have been done in the lab of Nicholas
Christakis. In one (virtual) experiment [43], humans were
placed into groups which had to perform a task. Unknown
to the participants, these groups also contained robot agents.
The robotic agents were programmed to make occasional
mistakes which adversely influenced group performance.
This behaviour led to the human participants who collab-
orated directly with a robot, to become more flexible in
finding solutions that benefited group performance. Simi-
larly, a related experiment [50] reported that humans who
collaborated on a task with robots which made occasional
mistakes and acknowledged their mistakes with an apology,
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became more social, laughing together more often, and more
conversational.
The design of virtuous sex robots requires thinking about a
setting in which to test and apply them. A case study will give
the constraints necessary for the design to be specific and fea-
sible. We further think that building a robot which can operate
in long-term intimate relations in general first requires at least
building a robot which can operate on a smaller timescale
with a specific target audience. Furthermore, it would be
necessary to have the support of supervisors—next to the
AI researchers which should of course also be involved—
that have professional training in psychology or psychiatry.
We therefore propose to start with testing virtuous sex robots
in a therapeutic setting.
As the specific target audience or participants, we sug-
gest to consider persons who have been diagnosed with
a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD [6]) as the com-
mon medical understanding of NPD aligns well with the
previously given definition of compassion. We propose to
consider NPD patients who are already within a therapeutic
setting, as this means that testing can be done in a con-
trolled environment, under supervision of professionals in
psychiatry, psychology, and sexology. The robot’s design,
testing and development beforehand should involve these
same professionals, especially regarding the potential effects
of a robot’s refusal of certain kinds of interaction. The antici-
pated link with compassion can be found in the latest edition
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders (DSM-5). In it, narcissism is described as a “pervasive
pattern of grandiosity, need for admiration, and lack of empa-
thy” [6]. Nine indicators are listed for narcissistic behaviour,
of which the third, fifth, and sixth are of special interest for
us here. Respectively, those indicators are about the narcis-
sist feeling special, being exploitative in social relations, and
lacking empathy. If compassion as a virtue is the golden mean
between two extremes, then it seems that the narcissist, who
feels better than others and is self-obsessed, is at one extreme
of the spectrum.9 We would describe this extreme (or vice)
as having the tendency to being overly involved with oneself.
Hence, training the virtue of empathy and compassion would
be most relevant for this focus group. Designing and evaluat-
ing a robot aimed at influencing the behaviour of persons is
the most prominent, and challenging, task to be set. Though
9 In the spirit of virtue ethics, one could consider Dependent Personality
Disorder (DPD) to be the other extreme on the compassion spectrum
[6]:
They are willing to submit to what others want, even if the demands are
unreasonable. Their need to maintain an important bond will often result
in imbalanced or distorted relationships. They may make extraordinary
self-sacrifices or tolerate verbal, physical, or sexual abuse.
It would be interesting to investigate how love and sex robots could be
relevant for training and therapy for members of this group as well.
there is a lack of information on successful NPD treatments
[21], there is some preliminary evidence that empathic treat-
ments of those with NPD have positive effects [10].
Obviously, operationalizing our proposal requires careful
testing before the possibility of actual use in training is even
considered, as the care for patients and the safety of those
potentially harmed by their conduct is paramount. One poten-
tial worry might be, for example, that people with narcissistic
tendencies become more proficient in their manipulations.
Therefore, professionals involved would need to closely
monitor the patients and signal such possible undesired
effects. These cautionary words notwithstanding, the poten-
tial support of compassionate robots for NPD treatments is in
line with the aforementioned preliminary evidence [10] and
worth further investigation.
The next step in making the robot ready to teach compas-
sion is by training it to give basic responses to certain kinds of
behaviour. As proposed before, this could be done by train-
ing it on recordings of how compassionate people respond
to different kinds of (inappropriate) behaviour. This means
the robot has to recognize at least one extreme on the com-
passion spectrum in terms of behaviour of its partner, and
has to perform behaviour appropriate to what it observes.
Figuring out what good identifiers of those extremes are and
what responses work best will need to draw heavily on the
expertise of the psychiatrists involved.
Compassion is considered here as the virtue which lies
between the extremes of only caring about oneself, the narcis-
sist, or of only caring about another person. That means that
a robot designed to treat these kinds of disorders should be
able to direct behaviour towards the middle of the spectrum,
where there can be a healthy focus on both caring for oneself
and caring for others. We suggest that it may be worthwhile
to investigate whether and how such behaviours could be
influenced by a compassionate robot. If this turns out to have
promising results, work can be done on improving the design
and expanding the use of such robots for other settings and
for other groups of people.
5 Implications of Virtuous Sex Robots
We have striven to demonstrate that virtue ethics provides
a useful framework for analysing the implications of sex
robots, as well as for making recommendations for the
design and application of such robots. We consider robot-
sex as involving and supporting a reciprocal interaction
between human agents and robots instead of as a form of
uni-directional instrumental tool use. Applying virtue ethics
led us to suggest a consent-module for sex robots that could
support the development or strengthening of compassion in
supervised, therapeutic scenarios. As such, sex robots may
contribute to the cultivation of virtues in humans. However,
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virtue ethics does come at a price. In addition to its potential
of providing an interesting perspective of the issues sur-
rounding sex robots, it may also raise new problems. As an
illustration of the latter, we would like to briefly reflect on
two implications of implementing a consent-module. Robots
saying ‘no’ towards the human that uses or owns them can
lead to at least two related principled problems and one big
practical challenge.
First, robots that refuse to comply with the demands or
wishes of human beings may obstruct a person’s autonomy,
for example, as expressed by someone’s immediate or long-
term desires (see for a field study in the context of service
robots for elderly [9]). Second, there is the threat of a respon-
sibility gap. Finally, there is the practical challenge of how
to design such a consent-module. We will offer some minor
suggestions to address the latter at the end of this section.
We will illustrate the problem of a user’s autonomy by
considering a simple example in a different context. Imag-
ine a beer robot, a simple system that keeps a stock of beers
cooled and that brings one on demand. Obviously, at some
point this might result in intoxication of the person demand-
ing the beer. To what extent should a (‘virtuous’) beer robot
be enabled to refuse the demands for another beer? Even
though the consequences of intoxication may be bad for the
persons themselves, as long as no one else or no one else’s
property is hurt, one might conclude that it is an expression
of a person’s autonomy to keep the beers coming. It is only or
at least primarily in the context of negative effects for other
persons or legal agents, that one could morally or legally
preclude someone from having their wishes gratified. So, on
the one hand, the human should be in control, but at some
point or in certain contexts it could be legitimate or morally
acceptable to limit the amount of control a human may have.
Regarding the responsibility gap, the problem is that when
a human instructs a well-functioning robot to do something,
and the robot is programmed to refuse to follow the instruc-
tions, all kinds of consequences may follow from that refusal
for which the human, in essence, cannot or need not be
held responsible. This leads to the question: Who would be
responsible or accountable for any damages, psychological or
physical, that may ensue? Of course, problems regarding the
consequences of saying ‘no’ are not specific to virtue ethics.
Rather, they are a consequence of any view that implies
that robots under certain conditions should refuse specific
instructions. However, this is worth discussing here because
our analysis of virtue ethics leads to proposal of a consent-
module, and its consequences should be noted. In our brief
discussion, we will try to focus as much as possible on the
specific nature of the ensuing problems in the context of sex
robots.
In order to address these issues of autonomy and respon-
sibility, we suggest considering the principle of ‘meaningful
human control’. This principle has been discussed in the con-
texts of military robots and self-driving. The principle states
that ultimately humans should remain in control and carry
(ultimate) responsibility for robot decisions and actions [7].
However, it is far from clear what this principle amounts to
in practice, that is, what the requirements are for the robot so
that it is capable of enabling this principle. de Sio and van den
Hoven [44] indicate that humans merely ‘being in the loop’
or controlling some parameters may be insufficient for mean-
ingful control if other parameters turn out to be more relevant
to the robot’s use or if the human lacks enough information to
appropriately influence the process. In addition, possessing
an adequate psychological capacity for (assessing) appropri-
ate action is required for meaningful control, as is, thirdly, an
adequate (legal) framework for assessing responsibility for
consequences. Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven then anal-
yse meaningful control in terms of Fischer and Ravizza’s
[24] theory of guidance control. Guidance control is realized
when the decisional mechanism leading up to a particular
behaviour is “moderately reason-responsive”, meaning that
in the case of good reasons to act (or not), the agent can
understand these reasons and decide to act (or not), at least
in several different relevant contexts. Moreover, the decision-
making mechanism should be “the agent’s own”, in the sense
that there are no excusing factors such as being manipulated,
drugged, or disordered.
This, admittedly brief, consideration of meaningful guid-
ance control provides a criterion that might be useful for
the consent-module. It provides ground to think that when a
human does not possess sufficient guidance control, or, by
robot compliance with human instructions, may lose such
control, a robot could be justified in non-compliance. This
leads to two questions that need to be answered before a
virtuous sex robot can be enabled with a consent-module,
allowing it to refuse commands:
1. Is the person giving the current command in a state of
meaningful human control?
2. Will complying with the current command lead to a
reduction of meaningful human control, such that (5) is
no longer the case?
In relation to the first question, the beer robot could make
use of relatively reliable physiological measurements (like
breath or blood analyses), or behavioural observations (like
slurred speech or coordination difficulties). It will be more
difficult to figure out which input patterns might engage the
consent-module to generate refusals. Here too, the exper-
tise of psychologists and psychiatrists, in relation to NPD
for instance, is required. The main suggestion here is that a
DSM-5 classified disorder in itself constitutes a reason for at
least considering the possibility that the ability to act reason-
ably and compassionately might be affected, or that sound
judgement and behavioural control might be impaired. Prac-
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tically speaking, it would be relevant to investigate the extent
to which data acquisition methods related to emotion recog-
nition and sexual harassment might apply. Among potential
indicators one could think of, for example, the human’s lack
of allowing turn-taking in communication, tone of voice and
body posture, neglect of robotic non-verbal signals of non-
interest, and so on (see, e.g., [36,38]). As a second step,
investigations regarding the applicability of machine learn-
ing techniques are relevant (e.g., [23]).
The second question points to a difference between the
case of the beer robot and the virtuous sex robot. In case of the
beer, a prediction about the intoxication can be made on the
basis of physiological variables. Given certain physiological
aspects, the time course of the intoxication can be inferred
with reasonable, and legally satisfactory, certainty. An intox-
ication level close to life-threatening alcohol-poisoning, just
to mention a relatively clear case, could result in justifiable
robot non-compliance. However, in the case of the virtuous
sex robot such a prediction about the consequences of (non-
)compliance is not as straightforward. For this reason too, it
bears emphasis that we are suggesting the investigation of
the consent-module within clinical contexts. Assuming, for
the moment, agreement regarding the appropriateness of a
robot’s non-compliance in certain situations, there is still a
further question about how the non-compliance should be
put into effect. We just mention a few possibilities here. One
option is that a robot may refuse to comply, provide an expla-
nation in terms of its assessment of the potential negative
consequences, and provide information aimed at improved
self-understanding and self-control. Ideally, this could result
in a retraction of the instruction given. Another option may
be that the robot refuses and informs a support group of, say,
significant others or therapists. A more extreme option would
be that the robot refuses and stops functioning altogether, by
way of an emergency close-and-shutdown operation. Finally,
it is worth noting that we may need to stretch our concepts
of autonomy and responsibility beyond the individual and
recast them in terms of open-ended and ecological processes
(see [16]). Unfortunately, picking up this topic lies beyond
the scope of the present paper.
Undoubtedly, many other issues and ways of addressing
them surround the notion of a consent-module. We have
explicated the present ones to emphasize that virtue ethics
does not provide easy solutions. Rather, it opens up a research
domain in itself, one that comes with its own set of promises
and difficulties that will need to be addressed.
6 Conclusion
The field of robotics advances rapidly and robot ethics ought
to keep up. In the foreseeable future, there will be robots
advanced enough to evoke, even if only for a few minutes, the
experience in humans that they are interacting with another
human being. Unless a ban is implemented [37], which we do
not want to rule out, it is likely that love and sex relationships
with robots will be formed. How can we best understand and
evaluate such relationships? We have taken some initial steps
towards answering this question by arguing that virtue ethics
is better suited than instrumentalist approaches to evaluate
the subtleties of intimate human–robot relationships. Next
steps should involve careful testing and with this in mind we
have outlined how testing a consent-module for robots in a
therapeutic setting may yield useful insights. Importantly,
implications for user autonomy and responsibility should
remain in focus of future research.
Some challenges are anticipated. First, the misuse of sex
robots could have a lasting impression on an adolescent learn-
ing about intimate relationships, but there is also a positive
side to developing realistic looking and acting love robots.
Such robots could train people how to behave confidently
and respectfully in intimate relationships. In a therapeutic
setting, such robots could be used to improve empathy or
increase self-love in persons with respectively narcissistic or
dependent personality disorders.
Another challenge is society’s response to sex robots. It is
difficult if not impossible to predict how our conceptions of
love and sex will change with the introduction of love robots.
One risk here is that a potential societal taboo on love and
sex with robots would lead to fringe behaviours and scenes,
similar to the domain of drugs and prostitution. It is therefore
important that the topic of sex-robots, challenging, exciting,
or revolting as it may appear to different parties, remains
open for investigation and discussion.
The implications of developing love and sex robots are
potentially huge and we have striven to tentatively chart
one path, a virtue theoretical approach, within this domain.
Advances in other robotic fields, like care robots or military
robots, might have analogous implications. In these areas
too, we should avoid the mistake of assuming that robots
will not change the way we view healthcare and warfare. On
the contrary, we need to consider and assess which of these
changes would be desirable or should be avoided. In any
case, we would do well to avoid the suggestion that all these
developments are necessarily bad. We suggest that there is
the possibility, worthy to be investigated, that some changes
might be for the good. When we realize that the way we
design and use such robots is bound to affect us, we can think
about ways of improving ourselves through the technology,
by careful consideration and monitoring.
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